I
Discussing
the
concept of God is probably the most ancient speculative activity in human
history. One of the periods where such activity reached its pinnacle was late XVIII
Century Germany with all the debates between rationalists – either from the Aufklärung or from Spinozist tradition
–, the Sturm and Drang supporters and,
after the Kantian revolution, the transcendental idealists[1].
One of the most iconic moments concerning such discussion was the Atheism Dispute (1798-1800)[2]
where the concept of substance
becomes pivotal: should we understand God as somehow a separate substance from
our empirical world and ourselves? Concomitantly, should we define God as a
being, therefore with autonomous substance, or as something else? These two
questions were answered in very different ways. One could argue that God is a
separate substance and a separate being – as the Judeo-Christian tradition
does; or, one could argue that God and the world are the same substance – like
Spinoza did; one could even say that one cannot possibly know what God, or the
world in itself, are – as did Kant; or, finally, one could argue, following
Fichte’s revolutionary steps, that God is neither a separate being, nor a
separate substance – nor the same substance as the material world – and advocate
for an entire new conceptualization of God: as a divine moral order.
In order to shed light into this
subject I will analyze the debate inside the Atheism Dispute, in particular, the notions of God present in the
discussion between F. H. Jacobi and J. G. Fichte. Mediating this discussion was
K. L. Reinhold, with his attempt in finding a middle way between the two
philosophers[3],
and it is precisely on this role played by Reinhold that I wish to focus my
attention. In the present essay, in spite of the mediator’s alleged
allegiances, or true wishes of finding a sort of a neutral third way, I shall
argue that Reinhold does take a stand on the debate and that such stand is
along with Jacobi.
I will develop my essay in the
following way: first, in Section II, I will summarize Fichte’s notions
regarding the concept of God, namely how he understands such concept as not a
substance, or even a being. Then, in Section III, I shall do the same regarding
Jacobi’s opposing position. Finally, in Section IV, I will present Reinhold’s
attempt of a middle way and show how that attempt is nothing more than an
attempt because, all things considered, Reinhold’s concepts of God and
substance coincide with those of Jacobi. I will conclude my essay with a few
final remarks in Section V.
II
J. G. Fichte’s On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance (1798) is
the starting point for the Atheism
Dispute. This essay summarizes Fichte’s position regarding the concept of
God, the supersensible and how one can ground oneself in the world. According
to Fichte, the traditional religious interpretation of the concept of God lacks
the capability for truly grasping the divine essence. “You are finite. How
could that which is finite encompass and comprehend the infinite?”[4],
Fichte asks. And this question incorporates why, according to Fichte, real
atheism derives from failing to recognize the true essence of God and, consequently,
also failing to act according to the divine moral order. This is the reason why
the debate was a true atheist dispute: it was not merely the matter of one side
accusing the other of professing atheism; it was rather a dispute over what atheism is, which amounts, since
one cannot define atheism without a concept of God, to a dispute over what the
concept of God truly entails.
Fichte’s position is a very polemic
one precisely because he does not accept the notions of God as an entity with
personality, substantiality or any kind of recognizable propriety; such
proprieties will only limit what Fichte considers to be unlimited: “you simply
cannot think of personality and consciousness without limitation and finitude.
Consequently, by attributing these predicates to this being [God] you make it
into something finite, into a being similar to yourselves; and you have not
thought of God, as you wished, but rather you have only multiplied yourselves
in your thinking”[5].
Hence, this anthropomorphization of
God is, for Fichte, what real atheism is all about, for it diminishes the
incomprehensibly infinite divine into a mere creation of man, a creation that
mirrors his own human finite image.
What is God then for Fichte? It is
the moral order of the world: Fichte holds that “right action is possible, and
every situation is taken into account by [a] higher law; a moral act inevitably
succeeds as a consequence of that arrangement, and an immoral one inevitably
fails”[6].
Hence, it is this order in itself
that consists in God: “that living and active moral order is itself God; we
require no other God and can grasp no other”[7].
The moral order of the world, what is truly divine, manifests itself through
laws and reason offering an unshakable certainty about the world, God and what
is right and wrong: “It is... a misunderstanding to say that is doubtful
whether a God exists or not. It is not doubtful at all but rather the most
certain thing that there is. Indeed, it is the ground of all other certainty,
the single absolutely valid objective fact: that there is a moral world-order,
that a determinate place in this order is assigned to every rational individual
and his work is taken into account; that the destiny of each individual,
insofar as it is not caused, so to speak, by his own conduct, is a result of
this plan... and that for those who rightly love only the good, all things must
conduce to the best”[8].
Therefore, God, for Fichte, can be neither
a separate being, nor a separate substance: “there is no ground in reason from
which one can proceed and, by means of an inference from that which is grounded
to its ground, assume some separate being as the cause of that which is
grounded”[9].
This is the key element: since God, as the infinite certainty, must be what
grounds the world, then how can a separate being be the ground for that which
it is not connected to? The exact same argument works for the issue of
substance, hence, for Fichte, “the concept of God as a separate substance is
impossible and contradictory”[10].
How are we to connect with God then?
According to Fichte this happens through revelation.
However, it is not a revelation that comes from the outside of any individual.
Fichte asks: “if the belief is not already in human beings, then I would at
least like to know this much: from where, then, do your representatives – who,
after all, are only human beings – themselves receive what they wish to provide
us through the force of their proofs; or, if these representatives are in fact
beings of a higher nature, how can they count on getting through to the rest of
us and becoming intelligible to us, without presupposing in us something
analogous to their belief?”[11]
Revelation comes with our conscience of ourselves; and our freedom comes from
acting upon that revelation.
This is what is truly revolutionary about
Fichte’s proposal: if God is not a separate being, or a separate substance, but
a moral order that manifests itself in a plan then, human beings, as rational
selves, are capable of accessing such moral order – therefore God – within
their own consciences: if God is not a separate being, nor a separate
substance, then the supersensible – that which is commonly accepted to be
divine – must also be within ourselves
because there are no other beings, or substances, where the divine could be. Also,
it is in our individual freedom to assume (what we discern to be) our rational
goal as a moral goal that consists
divine revelation: by listening to reason, by rising myself to the
transcendental viewpoint[12],
I am able to soar[13]
above the sensible world, hence accessing the supersensible through divine
revelation – that consists in knowing what is my moral duty to the world. Hence, I am free to fulfil my moral duty
to God by compelling myself, through individual revelation, to the moral order
of the world. That freedom, Fichte tells us, “is not indeterminate; it has a
goal. Only it does not receive that goal from the outside but rather posits it
through itself. I myself and my necessary goal are the supersensible”[14].
Atheism,
according to Fichte, is therefore not to listen to ourselves, to enslave our
will to the will of others because “I cannot doubt... freedom and the
determination thereof without surrendering myself. I cannot doubt, I say,
cannot even think the possibility that it is not so, that this inner voice
deceives me, or that this inner voice must first be authorized and grounded
elsewhere. Consequently, with regard to this matter I cannot quibble,
subtilize, or explain at all. That pronouncement is what is absolutely positive
and categorical”[15].
To love God, to wish to ensure a moral – and divine – order in the world,
implies the courage to surrender ourselves
to our duty towards the world: a duty that is revealed while positing our place in the moral order. It is this dichotomy,
between surrendering and positing – or between duty and freedom – that fuels
our limited existence. As for the divine moral order, there is no conflict,
there is only divine harmony; hence, in surrendering myself to it, as I posit
my own freedom, I too achieve harmony: when existing within the limits of my
own existence, I can find my place in the moral order that I, on the one hand,
belong to, and that, on the other hand, I also posit as my own.
From this
dichotomy – to surrender to what I also posit as myself –, Fichte derives the
absolute necessity of faith. However,
faith is not “a free decision to regard as true whatever his heart desires
because it wishes this very thing”[16]
or “supplementing or replacing the sufficient grounds of conviction with hope”[17].
Faith arises precisely from the absolute certainty that the divine moral order
posit in the world through myself; by
bringing harmony to myself and, at the same time, surrendering myself and
positing myself onto the world. I experience a moral disposition towards the moral world order, therefore, because
“morality, as certainly as this is what it is, can be constituted absolutely
only through itself”[18],
and the “conviction of our moral vocation is itself already issued from a moral
disposition, and is faith”[19], then
“the element off all certainty is faith”[20].
In sum, Fichte
assumes faith in God but rejects the traditional view of what faith, or God,
are. According to Fichte, God is a moral order (hence neither a separate being
nor a separate substance) that grounds the world. Since the divine is not a
separate substance, nor a being, the divine world-order is revealed to us individually. This individuality results
in a very strong advocacy for freedom that is understood, simultaneously, as a
surrendering to, and a positing of, the divine moral world order that grounds
the world. By transcending the sensible world I can act by myself because I
know what I should be positing. This is the meaning of faith for Fichte: the
only thing that I can be absolutely sure about is me; and the limits of my
existence posit myself in the world. Therefore, because it is also through me
that the moral order is posited, I have the duty to surrender myself to the
goal of God, i.e. the moral order: “I must simply intend the goal of morality;
accomplishing it is possible; it is possible through me”[21].
Hence, I have the duty to fulfil, through me, what God posits to the world.
Therefore, my freedom is of great responsibility: I am also the author of the
world: “reality is not inferred from possibility, but the reverse. The saying
is not ‘I should because I can’ but rather ‘I can because I should’”[22].
III
In March of 1799, F. H. Jacobi
endorses a letter to Fichte trying to refute several of the latter’s arguments
and accusing Fichte’s view of atheism because it amounts to defending the idea
that there is nothing outside the I. Jacobi refuses what he calls Fichte’s
“inverted spinozism”[23]
and advocates for a dualist understanding
of the world. This means that understanding God as a separate substance –
and also a separate being – is pivotal for Jacobi. According to him, Fichte
presents “an attempt to explain everything from a self-determining matter
alone”[24]
which implies an egoistic view of the world; in fact, “apart from dualism there
is only egoism”[25].
According to Jacobi, it is this
egoism, derived from the notion that nothing can exist outside the I, that
undermines the notion that what is true is “something which is prior to and outside knowledge; that which first gives a value to knowledge and
to the faculty of knowledge, to reason”[26].
For Jacobi, “the moral principle of reason, the
accord of man with himself, a fixed unity, is the highest principle within the concept, for this unity is
the absolute and unchanging condition
of rational existence in general,
hence also of all rational and free activity; in it and with it alone,
does man have truth and a higher life. But this unity is not itself the essence, it is not the true. Its self, in itself alone, is
barren, desolate and empty”[27]. What
is true, and what is the essence, must reside elsewhere: and to deny to the
divine properties such as substantiality is to assume that the emptiness of
reason is all there is beyond the sensible. Jacobi, dramatically, assumes: “if
the highest that I can recollect in me, that I can intuit, is my I, empty and
pure, naked and bare, with its self-subsistence and freedom, then reflective
self-intuition is a curse for me, and so rationality... I curse my existence”[28].
The pivotal point is exactly that of
substance. According to Jacobi, against dualism, only materialism and idealism –
hence, for him, two egoistic doctrines – advocate for one substance in the
world; therefore, these two views, according to Jacobi, both merge matter and
though, or infinite and finite, into one. Hence, we have Jacobi’s accusation
labelling Fichte’s system as inverted Spinozism: for Jacobi “little was lacking
for this transfiguration of materialism into idealism to have already been
realized through Spinoza. His substance, which underlies extended and thinking
being, equally and inseparably binds them together; it is nothing but the
invisible identity of object and subject (demonstrable only through inferences)
upon which the system of the new philosophy is grounded”[29].
It is the refusal of the divine as a separate substance that Jacobi does not
accept. To assume such idea implies that we only have ourselves and our world;
and, according to Jacobi, all meaning,
all ground, all that is true, vanishes with the refusal of God
as a separate being and substance. He complains: “I don’t understand this
jubilation over the discovery that there are only truths, and nothing true”[30].
It is against a world empty of
meaning and truth that Jacobi speaks: grounding the world in an order implies,
for Jacobi, grounding the world in itself,
which is tantamount to say that, when refusing a separate substance as the
ground, one is assuming that, in fact, there
is no ground. And a world – and hence man – grounded in itself must be
atheism for, according to Jacobi, if God is not outside of man then man must be
God. He proclaims: “God is, and is outside
me, a living, self-subsisting being, or I am God. There is no third”[31].
It is this reasoning that is behind
the accusation of atheism: according to Jacobi, Fichte – just as Spinoza before
him had already opened the way –, when refusing a separate divine substance,
and advocating for the divine as a moral order posited by individuals, is in
fact advocating for the substitution of a God that “never was”[32]
for a God posited – therefore created
– by individuals themselves: “Man finds God because he can find himself only in
God; and he is to himself unfathomable because God’s being is necessarily
unfathomable to him. ‘Necessarily’, for otherwise there would reside in man a supra-divine power, and God would then
only be the thought of someone finite, something imaginary, and by no means the Highest Being who subsists in Himself alone, the free
creator of all other things, the beginning and the end. This is not how it is,
and for this reason man loses himself as soon as he resists finding himself in
God as his creator, in a way inconceivable to his reason; as soon as he wants
to ground himself in himself alone”[33].
In sum, according to Jacobi,
Fichte’s system is atheistic because it fails to acknowledge the true ground,
foundation, meaning, beginning and end of the world – hence God – as a separate substance. When assuming
that God is not a separate being with its own substance, Fichte, according to
Jacobi, is denying God and transforming man, not in God’s creation, but in the
creator of God: “man has this choice, however, and this alone: Nothingness or a
God. If he chooses nothingness, he makes himself into a God”[34].
According to Jacobi, refusing a divine substance amounts to the latter possibility;
hence, the accusation for Fichte’s atheism.
IV
In April of 1799, K. L. Reinhold,
sends a letter to Fichte where he intends a sort of ‘third way’, or ‘middle
way’, between Fichte and Jacobi. Addressing to the former and also referring to
the latter, Reinhold announces: “I must take my standpoint between him and you”[35].
First, Reinhold equates Jacobi’s and Fichte’s notions of faith and belief. The
middle way seems to assent in the notion that only through the relationship
between philosophical knowledge and belief can knowledge be raised above mere
speculation[36]. According
to Reinhold, speculation is the act of abstracting from what is real[37],
which confers the philosopher with the capacity for creating “artificial
reason”[38];
it is artificial reason that will allow the philosopher to create limits in
infinite reality and comprehend the – now artificially created – finite in infinitum[39].
What Reinhold is actually doing, in spite of doing it while attempting to
explain Fichte’s philosophy, is taking a stand against Fichte: while for the
latter, it is from the standpoint of transcendental
philosophy that one grasps one’s freedom, for Reinhold, the act of
philosophizing, because achieved through speculation, isolates the philosopher
from the world and prevents his true freedom. Reinhold tells us: “only through
my freedom do I participate in infinitude. Therefore, how I originally find it
in conscience is as something finite to me but indissolubly connected with the
infinite in an admittedly incomprehensible manner.”[40]
However, since “from the standpoint of speculation I abstract from all that is
real”[41],
hence creating this artificial standpoint towards the world, then,
consequently, Reinhold concludes that “I [the philosopher] no longer possess my
freedom as such but rather freedom in itself, in me and for me, which artifice
has raised above its original essence, above its nature, and has torn itself
loose from the original connection of its finitude with the infinite”[42].
According to Reinhold, the philosopher[43] -
because philosophizing is speculation – instead of raising himself into true
freedom and soaring above the sensible world (as Fichte posited), isolates
himself in an artificial standpoint that separates him from the world, hence
losing true freedom. As we can see, Reinhold’s assumption is the opposite that the one of Fichte.
Reinhold continues his letter by assuming that
“what is originally true, which is independent of knowledge, is contained in
that artificial knowing only insofar as it is reproduced and can be reproduced
in infinitum by that knowing, and only to the extent that it can be presented,
expounded, and represented by means of something comprehensible in infinitum”[44].
Therefore, because what the philosopher creates is an artificial – therefore
comprehensible – limitation of the infinite, “that which is absolutely incomprehensible
and genuinely infinite... can never be found in that knowing, through which
only something finite can be established in infinitum”[45].
Two simple conclusions here: first, the philosopher cannot possibly ground his
knowledge in the infinite because he is limited to his own artificial finite
speculation; second, that what is true is independent
from knowledge. We already saw how the first conclusion is opposite to Fichte’s
system; however, the second will lead us to Reinhold’s true choice of sides:
the one that advocates that God must be a separate substance.
According to Reinhold, since all
speculation is independent from truth, if we want to find truth we must turn
ourselves elsewhere. He assumes: “there
is a pure conviction that is not
the speculative, philosophical one: and [it is that] God exists and is essentially
different from nature”[46].
Reinhold solves the problem that he sees in Fichte’s system (that speculation
isolates the philosopher from the infinite and true freedom) by assuming that
the only true knowledge we can have is the one that does not come from
speculation; ant this means that that pure knowledge must come from the
infinite – God – that, in its essence,
is different from nature. It is the
endorsement of dualism that solves
Reinhold’s problem. Therefore, unequivocally, in this second – and pivotal –
issue, Reinhold sides with Jacobi against Fichte (once again)[47].
Reinhold makes a feeble attempt in
defending Fichte when he explains why he believes that there is a misunderstanding
regarding Fichte’s philosophy: according to him that misunderstanding occurs
“when one mistakes the original freedom revealed to us only through conscience alone for the absolute freedom that is real only in, through, and for speculation, and sets the
latter in place of the former by thinking God”[48].
Basically, Reinhold says that the misunderstanding occurs when we take the
artificial result of speculation and infer it to be actually true. This misunderstanding, Reinhold
tells us, “can turn feeble believers and
heterodox believers into atheists”[49].
However, Reinhold continues, “whoever correctly
understands this philosophy must realize and know from it that the reality of
the original freedom is presupposed
by the absolute freedom of the philosopher and is explicable from and through the latter freedom only by means of and for knowledge
that progresses in infinitum”[50].
Reinhold seems
to be defending Fichte here: according to him, if we are to correctly
understand Fichte’s system we will see that he is no atheist at all; however,
the question that remains here, is that Reinhold’s defence is a poisoned
argument: we already know that Reinhold holds a different position than Fichte
regarding the standpoint of philosophy, freedom and the divine substantiality
of God. Hence, despite Reinhold’s benevolent effort, if Fichte is to stick to
his convictions, then, according to Reinhold’s argument (that intends to defend
Fichte), Fichte would, in fact, be an atheist.
This notion is
deepened when Reinhold establishes that: “the philosopher, therefore, as philosopher, knows nothing but nature and mere nature at that, the essence
of which just consists of finitude in
infinitum. He would necessarily have to be an atheist if he could be nothing more
than a philosopher”[51].
According to Reinhold, it is necessary to add the pure knowledge of God to the
philosopher’s speculative knowledge: it is that pure knowing[52]
that, through Fichte’s original moral-religious feeling[53],
is going to fulfil the emptiness of artificial reason: “therefore, as a human
being, he believes along with Jacobi that without this felling his pure knowing would not only be mere speculation, which is all it can be anyway, but also empty speculation,
which it should not be at all”[54]. Once
more, Reinhold sides with Jacobi: the philosopher’s reasoning is empty unless it is filled with the essence
that the speculative philosopher alone cannot grasp: true faith in a true God.
V
We can conclude
that Fichte’s revolutionary understanding of God, and his refusal of the
traditional depiction of God as an entity with personality and substantiality,
was received by Jacobi as an advocacy for atheism. Jacobi’s main argument for
Fichte’s alleged atheism was, precisely, the fact that Fichte denied God the
proprieties of a separate being with a separate substance. Jacobi goes even
further and establishes that any philosophy that refuses dualism must be an
egoistic philosophy because such philosophies uphold the idea that man creates
God and not the contrary.
Regarding this
dispute, Reinhold attempts to find a third way, a sort of middle ground between
Fichte and Jacobi. In fact, Reinhold does present his middle way by combining
features of both philosophers; however, since on the most pivotal points he
diverges strongly from Fichte and sides with Jacobi (specially in what regards
the issue of God being a separate substance and being), we are lead to believe
that Fichte was not very happy, neither with Reinhold’s attempt of a third way,
nor with Reinhold’s efforts on acquitting Fichte from the accusation of
atheism. In fact, if we take Fichte’s standpoint, Reinhold’s letter is doing
exactly the opposite to what was his explicit intention.
Bibliography
F.
H. Jacobi, ‘Jacobi to Fichte’, in F. H. Jacobi, ed. by George di Giovanni, The Main Philosophical Writings and the
novel Allwill, McGill-Queens Press, 1995, pp. 497 - 536
Frederick
Beiser, The Fate of Reason, Harvard
University Press, 1987
J.
G. Fichte, ‘On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance’, in Y.
Estes & C. Bowman, J. G. Fichte and
the Atheism Dispute (1798-1800), Ashgate, 2010, pp. 21 - 28
K.
L. Reinhold, ‘Letter to Fichte’, in Y. Estes & C. Bowman, J. G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute
(1798-1800), Ashgate, 2010, pp. 134 – 143
[1]
Regarding this debate please see Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason, Harvard University Press, 1987
[2]
I am taking this title from Y. Estes & C. Bowman (ed. by), J. G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute
(1798-1800), Ashgate, 2010
[3]
To regard Jacobi as a philosopher would not be a peaceful statement in some
circles: some philosophers relegated Jacobi for a secondary role. According to
Beiser, Mendelssohn, for example, regarded Jacobi as “a mere literatus, who was
not worthy of his time” (in Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason, Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 63
[4] J.
G. Fichte, ‘On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance’, in Y.
Estes & C. Bowman, J. G. Fichte and
the Atheism Dispute (1798-1800), Ashgate, 2010, p. 27
[5] Ibidem, p. 26
[6] Ibidem, p. 25
[7] Ibidem, p. 26
[8] Ibidem, p. 27
[9] Ibidem, p. 26
[10] Ibidem, p. 27
[11] Ibidem, p. 21
[12] Ibidem, p. 23
[13] Ibidem, p. 24
[14] Ibidem, p. 23
[15] Ibidem, p. 23
[16] Ibidem, p. 22
[17] Ibidem, p. 22
[18] Ibidem, p. 23
[19] Ibidem, p. 23
[20] Ibidem, p. 23
[21] Ibidem, p. 24
[22] Ibidem, p. 24
[23] F.
H. Jacobi, ‘Jacobi to Fichte’, in F. H. Jacobi, ed. by George di Giovanni, The Main Philosophical Writings and the
novel Allwill, McGill-Queens Press, 1995
[24] Ibidem, p. 502
[25] Ibidem, p. 502
[26] Ibidem, p. 513
[27] Ibidem, p. 517
[28] Ibidem, p. 517
[29] Ibidem, p. 502
[30] Ibidem, p. 512
[31] Ibidem, p. 524
[32] Ibidem, p. 512
[33] Ibidem, p. 523
[34] Ibidem, p. 524
[35] K.
L. Reinhold, ‘Letter to Fichte’, in Y. Estes & C. Bowman, J. G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute
(1798-1800), Ashgate, 2010, p. 134
[36] Ibidem, p. 135
[37] Ibidem, p. 137
[38] Ibidem, p. 136
[39] Ibidem, p. 136
[40] Ibidem, p. 137
[41] Ibidem, p. 137
[42]
Ibidem, p. 137
[43]
A small provocation could be made here and infer that, when referring to the
philosopher, Reinhold has in mind Fichte.
[44]
K. L. Reinhold, ‘Letter to Fichte’, in Y. Estes & C. Bowman, J. G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute
(1798-1800), Ashgate, 2010, p. 138
[45]
Ibidem, p. 138
[46]
Ibidem, p. 139
[47]
Reinhold’s explains thoroughly how his dualism unfolds in his
philosophy: “as nature, what is true in natural consciousness is possible only for experience – that is, for knowing that consists of sensible perceiving extending in infinitum as well as the thinking
that is related to it – so-called empirical
knowing. As God, what is true in natural consciousness is possible only for consciousness; and in conscience it
is only possible for belief, which is
grounded in a supersensible, original
feeling that is incomprehensible in its origin: a feeling that neither nature nor our freedom was able to give to us, and that we must assume on account
of the belief that results from it,
as something that is God-given, as
the revelation of God in us” (in K.
L. Reinhold, ‘Letter to Fichte’, in Y. Estes & C. Bowman, J. G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute
(1798-1800), Ashgate, 2010, p. 139). It is through his dualist understanding of reality that Reinhold
intends his third way; however, since he assumes explicitly that “God exists
and is essentially different from nature”[47],
and also that Jacobi’s and Fichte’s discussion is essentially about substance,
it is very difficult to understand his theory as a middle way, and not an
endorsement of Jacobi’s position.
[48] Ibidem, p. 141
[49] Ibidem, p. 141
[50] Ibidem, p. 141
[51] Ibidem, p. 138
[52] Ibidem, p. 143
[53] Ibidem, p. 143
